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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are identical to those listed 
in the caption on the front cover, except that the "et al." 
designation does not refer to any party. Gary DeLand is the only 
defendant. 
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
by the Third Judicial District Court• Defendant challenges the 
jurisdiction of the District Court to hear this matter as well as 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Utah to order the 
relief plaintiff seeks because it is not available by Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, because the Western Interstate Corrections Compact 
precludes review of plaintiff's placement in Utah by the Utah 
courts, and because the relief he seeks would require the courts 
of the State of Utah to take jurisdiction over the State of 
Arizona. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1• Is the remedy plaintiff seeks available by Writ of 
Habeas Corpus? 
2. Does plaintiff have a constitutional right to be housed 
in Arizona? 
3. Do the courts of the State of Utah have jurisdiction to 
order that plaintiff be returned to the State of Arizona? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Western Interstate Corrections Compact, Chapter 28, 
Title 77, Utah Code Annotated is determinative of the issues in 
this case. A full text of the statute is in the addendum to this 
brief. The provisions of the due process clauses of the Utah 
Constitution and the United States Constitution are at issue, but 
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the case law on the issue is determinative. Defendant represents 
that the due process clauses neither prohibit or create the right 
plaintiff seeks to establish. Copies of the constitutional 
provisions are also in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case deals with plaintiff's effort to be serve his 
sentence pursuant to an Arizona conviction at the place of his 
choosing. Plaintiff is housed in Utah pursuant to the Western 
Interstat€> Corrections Compact, Chapter 28, Title 77, Utah Code 
Annotated., He desires to serve his time in Arizona, but the 
Arizona authorities have decided to have him remain in Utah 
pursuant to the provisions of the compact. Plaintiff has sued in 
the Third District Court seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus against 
the executive director of the Utah Department of Corrections to 
have the Utah courts order the Arizona authorities to take plain-
tiff back to Arizona to serve his time there. After the denial 
of his Writ by the Third District Court, plaintiff brought this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated pursuant to a con-
viction in the State of Arizona. (R.4,5) 
2. Plaintiff is housed in the Utah Sate Prison pursuant to 
the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, Chapter 28, Title 77, 
Utah Code Annotated. (R.4) 
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3, Plaintiff was transferred to the State of Utah by the 
State of Arizona after plaintiff's request to be so transferred. 
(R.5) 
4. Plaintiff now desires to be returned to the State of 
Arizona, but the State of Arizona has refused his request and has 
determined to house him in Utah pursuant to the Western Inter-
state Corrections Compact. (R.6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The remedy that plaintiff seeks is not available by way of 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. Habeas Corpus may be used only to remedy 
constitutional deprivations. Plaintiff's incarceration in Utah 
pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact does not 
violate either the Utah Constitution or the United States 
Constitution. 
An inmate has no right to determine where he serves his 
incarceration. A state may incarcerate its inmates at any prison 
it chooses and in any state that allows the housing of inmates 
from other states. 
The Utah courts do not have jurisdiction to review Arizona's 
decision to incarcerate plaintiff in Utah because such review is 




PLAINTIFF'S REMEDY IS NOT AVAILABLE BY WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
In Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 901 (1981), the Supreme Court 
of Utah held that a writ of habeas corpus can be used to 
challenge as unconstitutional specific conditions of an inmate's 
incarceration. The Court also explained that not every matter of 
prison administration should be reviewed by the courts: 
Problems concerning or arising out of internal prison 
administration will be addressed by the courts only 
with reluctance and upon a showing of a violation of 
important rights. Prison administrators are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of prisons. 
Id. at 901. (Emphasis added.) 
If plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of 
infringing upon an important constitutional right, no cause of 
action has been stated. 
Plaintiff has grounded his complaint for relief by way of 
Writ of Habeas Corpus on an alleged violation of his "rights to 
due process" as secured "under the constitution of Utah under 
Article I, § 7, and furthermore, under the eighth [sic] and 
fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." 
(R.9; Plaintiff's brief, p. 7) He also bases his right to relief 
upon the provisions of the Western Interstate Corrections 
Compact, the compact under which plaintiff was transferred to 
Utah. 
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The Western Interstate Corrections Compact establishes no 
constitutional guarantee to an inmate to be housed in the state 
that convicted him. See generally: Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Plaintiff improperly cites Article 
XI from a different compact, the Interstate Corrections Compact, 
Chapter 28a, Title 77, Utah Code Annotated, to establish a right 
to be returned to Arizona. However, the Interstate Corrections 
Compact is not at issue here. Even if it were, the language of 
Article XI establishes no right to be returned to Arizona. As 
more fully illustrated below, there is no constitutional right to 
serve a term of incarceration in any particular facility or in 
any particular state. Therefore, a Writ of Habeas Corpus cannot 
be used to obtain plaintiff's remedy. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN WHERE HE IS INCARCERATED 
In Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 246 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an inmate has no constitutional 
right to be housed or held in any particular facility. At issue 
in Olim, was a transfer, against the will of the inmate, from a 
prison in Hawaii to one in California. The transfer was brought 
about due to the beliefs of the prison authorities that inmate 
was a management problem. Plaintiff there claimed he had not 
been afforded constitutionally mandated procedural due process so 
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as to permit him to challenge the prison authorities' decision. 
The court stated: 
In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 
L.Ed.2d. 451 (1976); and Montanve v. Havmes, 427 U.S. 
236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d. 466 (1976), this Court 
held that an intrastate, prison transfer does not 
directly implicate the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Meachum, inmates at a Mass-
achusetts medium security prison had been transferred 
to a maximum security prison in that Commonwealth. In 
Montavne, a companion case, an inmate had been trans-
ferred from one maximum security New York prison to 
another as punishment for a breach of prison rules, 
this Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss 
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to 
invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process 
Clause". Meachum, 427 U.S., at 224, 96 S.Ct., at 2538 
(emphasis in original). It went on to state: 
"The initial decision to assign the convict to a par-
ticular institution is not subject to audit under the 
Due Process Clause, although the degree of confinement 
in one prison may be quite different from that in 
another. The conviction has sufficiently extinguished 
the defendant's liberty interest to empower the State 
to confine him in any of its prisons. "Neither, in our 
view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself 
protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from 
one institution to another within the state prison 
system. Confinement in any of the State's institutions 
is within the normal limits or range of custody which 
the conviction has authorized the State to impose."... 
Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that 
he will be incarcerated in any particular prison within 
a State, he has no justifiable expectation that he will 
be incarcerated in any particular State. 
Id. at 244-245, (emphasis in original). 
The Constitution clearly does not provide plaintiff a right 
to be housed in any particular facility in any particular state 
or to enjoy any particular custody level. Such decisions on 
where to house and classify the inmates are left to the discre-
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tion of prison administrators. An inmate has no right to be 
transferred when he desires. Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665 (8th 
Cir. 1986); Burr v. Duckworth, 547 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ind. 1982); 
Gregg v. Scully, 108 A.D.2d 748, 485 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1985). 
This is not a case of first impression for the Courts of 
Utah. In several recent petitions for writs of habeas corpus, 
the Third District Court has held that no constitutional right is 
implicated by the subject classification policies or the trans-
fer, or refusal to transfer, an inmate from one correctional 
facility to another. Remington v. DeLand, 87-C-4896 (Utah 3rd 
Dist., Nov. 23, 1987) (Judge Raymond S. Uno); Knoll v. Liston, 
87-C-4106 (Utah 3rd Dist., Oct. 5, 1987) (Judge James S. Sawaya); 
Brooks v. Cook, 87-C-3275 (Utah 3rd Dist., July 30, 1987) (Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup); Mackav v. House, 87-C-0752, (Utah 3rd Dist., 
July 22, 1987) (Judge Timothy R. Hanson); Gaines v. Utah Dept. of 
Corrections, 87-C-4290 (Utah 3rd Dist., July 22, 1987) (Judge 
Scott Daniels); Rodriguez v. Cook, 86-C-6175 (Utah 3rd Dist., May 
14, 1987) (Judge Kenneth Rigtrup); Montanve v. Shulsen, 83-C-6042 
(Utah 3rd Dist., July 20, 1984) (Judge J. Dennis Frederick, 
affirmed on appeal by letter opinion by the Supreme Court of Utah 
in Montanve v. Shulsen, No. 20159 (Utah S.Ct., April 1, 1985)). 
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POINT III 
UTAH COURTS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER ARIZONA CORRECTIONS 
Although plaintiff brought his habeas corpus action against 
Gary DeLandf Executive Director of the Utah Department of 
Corrections, his statement of issues in his appellate brief makes 
it clear that he is really challenging the decision of the 
Arizona Department of Corrections to not return him to Arizona to 
serve his sentence there. Under the provisions of the Western 
Interstate Corrections Compact, Arizona retains the right to 
determine whether an inmate sent from Arizona may return to 
Arizona. Pursuant to Article IV (a), Arizona has the authority 
to transfer an inmate to an institution to another party state. 
Likewise, Arizona retains the jurisdiction to determine whether 
it will continue the placement in Utah. Article IV (c) provides: 
Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the 
terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any 
time be removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or 
other institution within the sending state, for trans-
fer to another institution in which the sending state 
may have a contractual or other right to confine in-
mates, for release on probation or parole, for dis-
charge, or for any other purpose permitted by the laws 
of the sending state; provided that the sending state 
continue to be obligated to such payments as may be 
required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered 
into under the terms of Article III. 
(Emphasis added.) The sending state (Arizona) has both the right 
to determine whether to send an inmate to another state as well 
as the jurisdiction to determine whether to bring him back or 
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house him elsewhere. This decision making authority is a juris-
dictional issue which is not subject to review in the receiving 
state (Utah). Review by the Utah courts is expressly prohibited 
by the compact. Article V (a) expressly provides that "[a]ny 
decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which 
it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be con-
clusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state." 
Therefore, the Utah courts have no jurisdiction to review 
Arizona's decision to incarcerate plaintiff in Utah instead of 
Arizona. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's remedy is not available by Writ of Habeas Corpus 
because he has not raised a constitutional issue. Plaintiff has 
no constitutional right to be housed in the state that convicted 
him. He remains in Utah pursuant to Arizona's desire to house 
him here under the Western Interstate Corrections Compact. 
Review of Arizona's decision to not allow plaintiff to be moved 
back to Arizona is not reviewable by Utah courts because such 
review is prohibited by the compact. Plaintiff has raised no 
constitutional issues and the district court should be affirmed 
in its decision to deny plaintiff's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
DATED this </>- day of <£hrzn5&Z- , 1989. 
, L.YLJB- 0DE1 
/ / A^istant Attorney General 
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